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WARRANTY DISPUTES IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT UNDER
ARTICLE TWO, SALES: ADVANTAGE SELLER?
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Focus of this Article
This symposium asks whether the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has emerged as a major commercial law court.
This article will ask how well this Court' has performed in resolving
commercial disputes governed in whole or in part by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In particular, it will examine disputes over
liability and remedy when the buyer claims that the seller made and
breached a warranty of quality.
2
These are important Article 2 cases which typically involve the sale
of "big ticket" items between commercial parties. They include con-
tracts for the sale of complex or unique goods which are often designed
and manufactured with the buyer's particular business needs in mind.
They are, in the main, disputes which stem from direct contractual deal-
ings between merchants, many of whom have continuing trade relation-
ships. These disputes involve transactions where product failure results
in economic loss, both direct and consequential, rather than damage to
person or property. The risks, therefore, are outside the scope of conven-
tional first and third party insurance and the redistributional policies of
the law of torts. As such, risk allocation depends upon both the provi-
sions of Article 2 and the agreement of the parties. The transactions,
therefore, put a high premium upon the quantity and quality of the infor-
mation communicated between seller and buyer over needs and risks
3
* Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. BA, Denison
University (1954); JD University of Cincinnati College of Law (1957); LLM, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law (1958). The author thanks Professor Ian R. MacNeil for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article.
1. References to the "Court" in this Article mean the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. I have not discussed or cited decisions of the federal district courts.
2. For helpful background, see Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Trans-
actions, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 30 (1978)[hereinafter Project]. This Project was updated in Special
Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159
(1987) [hereinafter Update]. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
chs. 9-12 (3d ed. 1988); Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once
More Into the Void, 67 B.U.L. REV. 9 (1987).
3. Insufficient information by the seller may foreclose the buyer from establishing either an
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and the effort, if any, by the seller to allocate the various risks of product
failure to the buyer by agreement. Moreover, they test the success of
Article 2 as a framework within which private risk allocation can take
place.
4
My general conclusion is that, on balance, Seventh Circuit has fa-
vored the seller rather than the buyer in warranty disputes. The question
this raises is whether such an advantage is supported on the facts and
under a sound interpretation of Article 2.
B. Limitations on Judicial Process
This study is conditioned by the fact that the type of warranty dis-
pute which reaches the Court is fortuitous. The Court must wait for the
case (many are settled or resolved at a lower level) and it has no control
over the issues presented for decision. When the case arrives, the Court
is further confined by the limitations of the adversary system and, in di-
versity cases, by the dictates of Erie Ry. v. Tompkins.5 In addition, the
procedural posture of the case and the nature of the district court's ruling
will shape the issues which the court will decide and the scope of judicial
review.
Any evaluation, therefore, must consider how well the Court has
dealt with the disputes which did arrive under these constraints imposed
in the federal judicial process. The "how well," in turn, will depend
upon the quality of the methodology used by the Court when interpret-
ing and applying or filling the gaps in and around Article 2. In essence,
has the Court given reasonable effect to the intention of the language of
Article 2?
C. Code Methodology and Policy
An important aspect of this methodology is the recognition that Ar-
implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, U.C.C. § 2-315 (1987), or recovering consequent-
ial damages, U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1987).
4. The text of Article 2 is, with minor exceptions, the same in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin.
The Code became effective in Illinois on July 1, 1962, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 26 (1962), in Indiana on
July 1, 1964, IND. CODE §§ 26-1-1-101-26-1-10-106 (1964) and in Wisconsin on July 1, 1965, Wis.
STAT. tit. XL, chs. 401-09 (1965).
Article 2 in these states is, in essence, the 1958 Official Text of the U.C.C., which emerged from
the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code after the critical study of the 1953
Official Text by the New York Law Revision Commission in 1956-57. See Braucher, The Legislative
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958). Over the last thirty years,
Article 2 has been interpreted and applied in literally hundreds of judicial opinions and subjected to
extensive analysis by commentators. In the Seventh Circuit alone, the Court has decided at least
sixty-five cases since 1967 which relied in whole or in part on Article 2.
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ticle 2 is an integral part of a code which has a definite order and system.
The important hallmarks of the code form of legislation must be ob-
served by the court.6 Any opinion which fails to consider all of the rele-
vant sections, definitions, cross-references and comments in Article 2 and
the pervasive policies of Article 17 is highly suspect.
In addition, the court must articulate and apply the general substan-
tive policies underlying the order and system of Article 2.8 The starting
point is the definition of the term "agreement" in section 1-201(3) of the
UCC. "Agreement" is the "bargain of the parties in fact as found in
their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance .... ." as
defined in sections 1-205 and 2-208. 9 Around this expansive core defini-
tion, the bargain in fact of the parties ending must be determined on a
sliding scale. On the one extreme, the parties can draft a careful and
complete written agreement which, within certain limits, can vary the
6. Some of these hallmarks are identified and discussed in Gedid, U CC Methodology: Taking
a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341, 376-77 (1988). They are:
(1) a principle is stated in the text of a particular section, exceptions to that principle are
stated in the section itself or in statutory cross-references;
(2) There are permanent, safety valve provisions, such as the duty of good faith in the per-
formance and enforcement of the contract and the prohibition against unconscionable contracts;
(3) The underlying policies of various provisions are intended to be compatible;
(4) Mechanisms to keep the legal principles current and to fill gaps in the agreement are pro-
vided in the statute;
(5) There are principles of coordination, in that Code sections refer to each other and their
meaning remains consistent when more than one section applies; and
(6) There are principles of superordination, in that methods for handling competing and con-
flicting principles are provided.
7. See generally U.C.C. § 1-102 (1987) for underlying purposes, rules of construction and vari-
ation by agreement. In addition, see id. § 1-106 (remedial policy); id. § 1-203 (obligation of good
faith); id. § 1-205 (course of dealing and usage of trade.); and id. § 1-201 (general definitions).
8. Article 2 does not govern all issues that may arise in and around a contract for sale of
goods. Its provisions may be supplemented, see id. § 1-103 ("unless displaced by the particular
provisions" of the U.C.C., the "principles of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions") or
preempted by other state law. See, e.g., Leary & Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2, 31 VILL. L.
REV. 399, 405-422 (1986) (discussing non-uniform state law regulating certain aspects of warranty
law).
Moreover, in warranty disputes involving commercial leases, Article 2A, Leases §§ 2A-210
through 216 may govern and where consumer buyers are involved, Article 2 is preempted in part by
federal legislation, such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and by the state "lemon" laws. See
Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1985). Finally, the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, effective in the United States in Janu-
ary 1, 1988, has potential application to warranty disputes. Thus, the search for substantive sales
policies may transcend the scope of Article 2.
9. "Contract" is defined as the "total legal obligation which results from the parties' agree-
ment as affected by this Act and any other applicable rules of law." U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1987).




effect of Article 2.10 Product description, essential characteristics and
suitability, for example, could be set forth in great detail. Toward the
center of the scale, gaps in and around the written agreement can be filled
by extrinsic evidence of agreement, found primarily in trade usage and
the conduct of the parties, either before or after the particular bargain is
struck. 11 At the other end of the scale, gaps in the agreement, express or
implied, can be filled with standard or "off the rack" terms supplied by
Article 2, Part 3 "if the parties have intended to make a contract."'
12
These "off the rack" terms are designed to provide a balanced and fair
hypothetical agreement for parties who have intended to conclude their
bargain in fact but have failed to fill in all of the gaps. To use an obvious
example, if the parties have intended to contract but have not agreed on a
price, the gap filler is "a reasonable price at the time for delivery."'
3
Assuming that the contract terms, i.e., the bargain in fact and the "gap
fillers," have been determined, judicial efforts to resolve disputes over
performance and remedy must take other principles into account. Under
Article 2, the court may be required to: (1) Impose a higher standard of
conduct on merchant sellers and buyers;' 4 (2) Respond to the frequent
statutory invitation to use the surrounding commercial context to partic-
ularize standards;' 5 (3) Police the conduct of the parties against uncon-
scionability at the time of contracting' 6 and bad faith in the performance
and enforcement of the contract;17 and (4) Administer the remedial
structure to insure that an aggrieved party is provided a remedy that
protects its expectation interest, but not more.' 8
Finally, the methodology must also take into consideration the ob-
jective of uniformity. Section 1-102 states that "[t]his Act shall be liber-
ally construed and applied . . . to make uniform the law among the
10. See generally id. § 1-102(3), which sets the parameters for the power to vary the provisions
of the Code by agreement.
11. For example, "implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade."
U.C.C. § 2-314(3) (1987).
12. Id. § 2-204(3).
13. Id. § 2-305(1).
14. Eg., id. §§ 2-314(1) and 2-104(1). See Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987).
15. On the jurisprudence of Article 2, compare Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and
Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE L. J. 671 with Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975). See also Gedid, U.CC Methodology:
Taking A Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341 (1988).
16. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1987). See, e.g., Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between
Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065 (1986).
17. U.C.C. §§ 1-203 and 2-103(l)(b) (1987). See, eg., Burton, Good Faith Performance of a
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981).
18. On the importance of U.C.C. § 1-106(1), see White, The Decline of the Contract Market
Damage Model, 11 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 1 (1988).
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various jurisdictions." 19 Since section 1-102 is state law, a federal court
should, in the absence of clear local decisions to the contrary, seek to
facilitate this goal. Thus, where a state court has not yet ruled on a par-
ticular question of statutory interpretation, the court should not only
strive to reach a decision which is sound in terms of code methodology
and policy, but which also promotes uniformity. In short, the Court
should make every effort to reach the best interpretation of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
II. WARRANTY DISPUTES BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER: THE
ARTICLE 2 BALANCE
A. Framework for Agreed Risk Allocation
Beneath the order and system of the Code and its general policies
lies a more particular inquiry. In disputes over product quality, two
questions must be answered: (1) What balance does Article 2 strike be-
tween seller and buyer on questions of liability and remedy; and (2) To
what extent can the parties, by agreement, vary that balance? The an-
swers to these questions require a brief look at the legislative framework
for product risk allocation.
Warranty disputes arise when the buyer discovers that the goods
purchased do not satisfy its subjective expectations of quality and claims
that these expectations conform to the sellers objective obligations under
the contract. The seller's obligations, in turn, are determined by the
agreement of the parties. The agreement may range from complete writ-
ten specifications detailing every required characteristic and use of the
goods to the other extreme, where the only agreement is the contract
description and the price. 20 Given the range of possibilities, the higher
the buyer's subjective expectations, the greater the quantity and quality
of information and objective agreement that must be available to sustain
the claim that a warranty was made and breached. 21
1. Creation of Warranty
The warranty provisions of Article 2, sections 2-313, 2-314 and 3-
19. The quote is extracted from U.C.C. § 1-102 (1)-(2)(c) (1987).
20. At a minimum, "a contract is normally ... for a sale of something describable and de-
scribed." Id. § 2-313 comment 4.
21. See generally Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983), who argues that efficient product risk allocation requires that the burden
of producing, ex ante, information about particular purposes or special consequences from a breach
should be placed on the buyer. See U.C.C. §§ 2-315 and 2-715(2)(a) (1987). For an elaboration of
Bishop's analysis, see Speidel, supra note 2, at 48-52. See also Note, Imperfect Information, the
Pricing Mechanism and Products Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1988).
1989]
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315, supplement and fill gaps in the express agreement of the parties.
Section 2-314(1) provides a baseline warranty: A warranty that the goods
are merchantable "shall" be implied when the seller is a "merchant with
respect to goods of that kind." Under section 2-313(1), however, express
warranties are created when the seller provides information (in the form
of affirmations, promises, description or samples) to the buyer about the
goods which becomes "part of the basis of the bargain." Under section 2-
315 the information flow is reversed. An implied warranty of fitness
arises when the buyer informs the seller (or the seller has reason to
know) of "any particular purposes for which the goods are required" and
the seller has reason to know "that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods." When made, these
warranties, express or implied, are terms of the contract for sale. They
help determine what the seller has "in essence" agreed to sell.22 In the
absence of a warranty appropriate to the buyer's needs and purposes,
however, the buyer assumes the risk of unsatisfied subjective
expectations.
2. Remedies for Breach
Without more, the warranty provisions of Article 2 give an advan-
tage to the buyer. In contending that a warranty was created, there is a
good possibility, especially where merchantability is at stake or express
warranties are claimed, that the buyer's subjective expectations of quality
will coincide with the seller's objective contractual obligation. Moreover,
except for section 2-315, there is no requirement that the buyer prove
reliance on the claimed warranty. 23
This advantage is preserved when a breach of warranty has been
proved and the buyer seeks damages. Although the range of remedial
options for direct damages depends upon whether the breach is discov-
ered before or after acceptance of the goods,24 the buyer may in any case
pursue claims for incidental and consequential damages under section 2-
715. Although there are limitations upon each remedy, the cumulative
effect is consistent with the policy of section 1-106(1) that the "remedies
22. See U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1987).
23. The requirement in U.C.C. § 2-313 (1987) that the affirmation become "part of the basis of
the bargain" will be discussed infra text accompanying note 60.
24. If the buyer has rightfully rejected the goods, U.C.C. § 2-601 (1987), or justifiably revoked
acceptance, id. § 2-608, the remedies catalogued in § 2-711(1) are available. They include cancella-
tion of the contract for breach, restitution of any price paid, and the choice between "cover," id. § 2-
712(1), and damages, id. § 2-713(1). In addition, the buyer may recover incidental, id. § 2-715(l), as
well as consequential damages, id. § 2-715(2)(a). If the buyer can neither reject the goods nor revoke
acceptance, the direct damage remedy is found in U.C.C. § 2-714.
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provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed. . ."
3. Limitations on Proof and Remedies
These apparent advantages are limited, however, if the buyer does
not discover the breach of warranty until after the goods have been ac-
cepted and the acceptance cannot be revoked under section 2-608. As a
practical matter, this is a likely situation, especially where the goods are
complex and require extensive testing.25
One effect of acceptance is that the buyer's direct damages are deter-
mined exclusively under section 2-714(2), although incidental and conse-
quential damages are still recoverable under section 2-715. Moreover,
the remedial dynamic has clearly changed. If the acceptance cannot be
revoked, the buyer is liable for the price as reduced for any damages
caused by the breach26 and has the burden of proving breach of war-
ranty, i.e., that the goods did not conform at the tender of delivery. 27
Finally, the longer the time lapse between tender of delivery and discov-
ery of the breach, the greater the risk that the buyer's remedial options
will decrease28 or be foreclosed. Thus, a breach of warranty claim will be
"barred" if the buyer either (a) fails to notify the seller of the breach
"within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered
any breach,"'29 or (b) fails to file a law suit within four years of the tender
of delivery, whether the breach has been discovered or not.
30
4. Disclaimers and Agreed Remedies
This legislative framework for risk allocation can be varied by agree-
ment between the parties. The seller has power through agreement with
25. Under U.C.C. § 2-513(1) (1987), the buyer "has a right before payment or acceptance to
inspect [the goods] at any reasonable place and time and in any reasonable manner." After the
buyer has a "reasonable opportunity to inspect ... " the goods are accepted if the buyer "signifies to
the seller that the goods are conforming .... " Id. § 2-606(1)(a), or "fails to make an effective
rejection .... Id. § 2-606(1)(b). After acceptance, the buyer must then satisfy the rigorous require-
ments for revocation under U.C.C. § 2-608 and, even then, may have agreed not to invoke that
remedy.
26. See U.C.C. §§ 2-607(1), 2-709(l)(a), and 2-717 (1987).
27. Id. § 2-607(4).
28. For example, the remedy of revocation of acceptance must be invoked "within a reasonable
time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it . I..." d  § 2-608(2).
29. Id. § 2-607(3)(a). For an effective critique of the "notice" requirement, see Reitz, Against
Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule in U. C.C. § 2-607(3)(a), 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 534 (1988).
30. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1987).
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the buyer to disclaim or limit implied warranties otherwise made3' and
to vary or limit remedies for breach of warranty.32 This power, however,
is limited by policies designed to prevent unconscionable conduct at the
time of contracting33 and unfair surprise in the communication of dis-
claimers34 and to preserve, despite agreement, some "minimum ade-
quate" remedy.
35
These limitations upon the seller's ability to alter the Article 2 bal-
ance to the buyer's detriment make good sense. As one court put it, the
"enforcement of such a provision is generally justified through the
buyer's superior ability to calculate and then to reduce the risk of sub-
stantial loss.... Without clear notice of that large potential liability, the
buyer cannot make use of these supposed advantages. ' 36
5. Privity
A final requirement, implicit in the text of Article 2, is that there
must be privity of contract between the seller and buyer in commercial
settings. Thus, a buyer that purchases unmerchantable goods from a re-
tailer cannot sue the manufacturer of those goods for breach of warranty,
at least not where the loss was solely economic. Article 2, however, in-
vites non-uniform legislative exceptions through variations on section 2-
318 and permits judicial abrogation of the privity requirement.
Although the issue remains open, the predominant view in the courts still
is that privity is required for warranty claims where the goods do not
cause damage to person or property.3 7
B. Relationship with Tort
In commercial cases, a recurring source of tension exists between
Article 2 and the law of torts. If an unmerchantable or "defective" prod-
uct causes damage to the person or property of the buyer or some third
party, the ground rules have become well established. The plaintiff may
either pursue a claim in strict products liability or a warranty claim
under Article 2. If a tort theory is pursued, the contractual limitations
which abound in Article 2 are not applicable.38
31. Id. § 2-316.
32. Id. § 2-718.
33. Id. § 2-719(3).
34. Id. § 2-316(2).
35. Id. § 2-719 comment 1. See Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability: Uncon-
scionability of Remedy, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (1988).
36. Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 592 (4th Cir. 1985) (Wilkinson, J.).
37. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 35-37.
38. The U.C.C., in most states, does not foreclose a buyer injured in person by unmerchantable
[Vol. 65:813
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The problem is more complicated when an unmerchantable product
causes only damage to the goods sold or economic loss in the form of
direct and consequential damages to the buyer. Article 2 clearly applies
to these disputes. But what about tort law? Can the buyer escape to tort
and avoid the limitations of Article 2?
In most states the answer is no. If the loss caused is economic, tort
is not available even though the goods created a risk of harm to person
and property.39 Despite recurring doubts about a line which depends
upon the type of loss created, the effect is to prevent the buyer from using
tort to escape the limitations found in Article 2.
In sum, Article 2 favors the buyer in the creation of warranties, ex-
press and implied, and in the remedial protection available upon breach.
The remedies, however, are limited if the buyer discovers the breach after
acceptance-a likely event. Moreover, the earlier advantages may be
neutralized through agreed risk reallocation devices such as disclaimers
and limited remedies. Finally, the buyer in a commercial case is virtually
a prisoner of Article 2 with its implicit requirement of privity. Tort law
is not available to escape the Code's risk allocation framework, and the
buyer, in many cases, will be required to sue a distributor or retailer
rather than the manufacturer of the goods.
Against this backdrop, how has the Seventh Circuit performed in
dealing with warranty disputes?
III. WAS A WARRANTY MADE AND BREACHED?
The first testing ground involves the questions of whether the seller
made and breached a warranty, express or implied. 40 Again, the relevant
provisions of Article 2 are sections 2-313, 2-314 and 2-315, along with
the principles of coordination and superordination in section 2-317.41
The buyer usually has the burden of proving that the seller made a war-
ranty and, after acceptance, the burden of establishing that the warranty
was breached at the time of tender.
42
goods from suing in strict products liability. The buyer may, in the alternative, sue the seller under
the U.C.C. for breach of warranty.
39. In Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, the law of torts does not apply if the product has caused
only economic loss. The buyer's sole remedy is under Article 2, with its requirement of privity. See
infra text accompanying notes 136-40.
40. A central inquiry is to determine "what it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell
" U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 (1987), and whether the tendered goods conform to that agree-
ment. Id. § 2-106(2).
41. For a discussion of U.C.C. § 2-317 and the relevant decisions, see Update, supra note 2, at
1283-89.
42. U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (1987).
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The Seventh Circuit cases deciding whether warranty was made and
breached have had three characteristics: (1) The buyer accepted the
goods and, therefore, had the burden to prove the breach, if any; (2) The
goods were complex or unique and the buyer had special needs for them;
and (3) There was no enforceable agreement to disclaim any warranty or
limit the remedies for breach. These characteristics, combined with the
Court's interpretation of the Code, have meant a singular lack of success
for the buyer.
A. Implied Warranty of Merchantability: Section 2-314
The question whether a merchant seller made an implied warranty
of merchantability has not yet been before the Court. Rather, the war-
ranty was assumed, 43 and the question was whether the buyer proved
that the goods were unmerchantable. Under section 2-314(2), "[g]oods
to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in
the trade under the contract description; and ... (c) are fit for the ordi-
nary purposes for which such goods are used ... ."" In no case where
the merchantability issue was raised, has the buyer prevailed.
In Royal Business Machines v. Lorrain Corps.,45 the buyer purchased
two high-tech copying machines from the seller over an eighteen month
period. Despite the seller's efforts to cure alleged deficiencies, the ma-
chines did not produce the volume expected by the buyer and were ex-
pensive to operate and maintain. After reviewing the evidence, the trial
court ruled that the copiers were unmerchantable. The Seventh Circuit,
however, reversed on the ground that the buyer had not proved unmer-
chantability. The Court found that the buyer failed to establish the trade
standards or usages for copiers of that type and description. Without
such standards, there was no basis for the Court to determine whether
the machines were "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used." Since there was "no evidence" to support the ruling, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the trial court was wrong as a matter of law.
46
43. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1987) provides that "[u]nless excluded or modified .... a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind." Note that reliance by the buyer is not required. The Court has stated
that the implied warranty of merchantability is "implied in law," see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chi-
cago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 1988), a dubious characterization in a commercial
case.
44. I have quoted only two of the six standards defining merchantability in U.C.C. § 2-314(2)
(1987).
45. 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 46-47. The Court also held that the buyer had not properly revoked acceptance
under § 2-608. This failure left the burden of proof on the buyer, although the Court did not cite
§ 2-607(4). Id. at 47-48.
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Similar reasoning has been employed in more recent decisions which
affirmed the trial court's granting of a directed verdict against the buyer.
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp.,47 the Court empha-'
sized that the buyer must prove both the ordinary purposes for which
"such goods" are used and that particular characteristics of the goods
made them unfit for ordinary purposes. 48 As illustrated by Binks Manu-
facturing Co. v. National Presto Industries,49 this is difficult to do where
the goods are a unique, custom designed machine which was the largest
and most complex that the seller had ever built. Thus, evidence consist-
ing solely of the contract description, the price charged, and specifica-
tions which were incomplete on essential characteristics was insufficient
as a matter of law. 50
At first blush, it is difficult to fault the result in these cases. Goods
which are reasonably capable of performing their ordinary functions, but
do not satisfy the buyer's particular needs, are merchantable under sec-
tion 2-314(2)(c).51 Because the buyer claimed substantial losses, how-
ever, one should expect a more elaborate analysis by the Court, especially
where, as in Royal Business Machines, a trial court ruling in favor of the
buyer was reversed. Instead, the discussion in that case was limited to a
sparse analysis of the essential statutory provisions and the record. Few
cases were cited and none were discussed. There was no reference to
history, legislative or otherwise, the Code's comments were ignored, and
the few references to secondary sources were not informative. At best,
acceptable results were achieved through incomplete Code methodology.
At worst, the Court, by focusing exclusively on the lack of proof of "or-
dinary" uses, failed to develop a sufficiently broad conception of
merchantability that might have sustained the trial court's judgment for
the buyer and also provided enlightenment in future disputes over that
47. 863 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1988), affirming a directed verdict against the buyer.
48. Id. at 513, 514. The question was whether steel which satisfied designations in the contract
and would "pass without objection in the trade under the contract description," U.C.C. § 2-
314(2)(a) (1987), was unmerchantable because of a high nitrogen content. The Court affirmed the
trial court's decision to direct a verdict against the buyer. On the evidence presented, no reasonable
juror could know the ordinary purposes of such steel and that the nitrogen content made the steel
unfit for those purposes.
49. 709 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (in the absence of evidence of the ordinary purposes
for which the unique goods were used, the Court affirmed a directed verdict against the buyer,
entered at the conclusion of evidence).
50. The Court relied upon Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981), stressing that the parties were sophisticated and of equal
skill and knowledge, the contract was bargained at arms length and the machine was larger and
more complex than any previously made by the seller. Id. at 1122.
51. See Project, supra note 2, at 76-79; Update, supra note 2, at 1206-13; J. White and R.




B. Implied Warranty of Fitness: Section 2-315
In similar transactions, buyers have been unable to establish that a
warranty of fitness for particular purpose was made under section 2-315,
much less breached. The seller has been held not to have had "reason to
know" at the time of contracting either "any particular purpose for
which the goods are required" or that the buyer was "relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select suitable goods .... ." These results are
typical of those reached by other courts under section 2-315.53
A good example is Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Zella Bros.,
Inc.,54 where the seller sold the buyer, an electric power company, "bel-
lows" type expansion joints to be incorporated into a thirty-inch steam
pipeline then under construction. The combination of normal stress and
the presence of an unexpected and unidentified corrosive agent caused
cracks to develop in the joints. Although the parties had extensive nego-
tiations and discussed the corrosive effect of chlorides in steam on joints,
the trial court held that there was no implied warranty of fitness and the
Court affirmed.
After analyzing section 2-315, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
while the seller knew the use to which the joints would be put and that
there was a risk of corrosion, the seller had no reason to know of the
specific agent that caused the crack. Furthermore, there was no industry
standard that defined a norm of expectation for "bellows" type expansion
joints. Given what the seller did not know and what the buyer did not
tell it, the Court was unable to imply a warranty that the joint would
resist corrosion from all unknown elements in the system. These facts
reinforced the conclusion that the seller had no reason to know that the
buyer was relying on its skill and judgment to provide protection against
all corrosion agents.
55
52. Such a broad conception should include at least three ingredients: (1) recognition that the
six definitions of merchantability in § 2-314(2) are cumulative and conjunctive-a failure to satisfy
any one is sufficient; (2) even though the goods appear to satisfy "ordinary" uses, if they malfunction
and cause loss to the buyer, this is evidence that they are not merchantable, see Streich v. Hilton-
Davis, 692 P.2d 440 (Mont. 1984); (3) proof of unmerchantability is frequently inferential, and wide
latitude should be given to the trier of fact. See, e.g., Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d
171 (Minn. 1978); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 413-14; Phelan and Falkof, Proving a
Defect in a Commercial Products Liability Case, 24 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 10 (1980).
53. See. e.g., Project, supra note 2, at 85-104; Update, supra note 2, at 1213-17.
54. 606 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1979).
55. The Court made a useful distinction between the purposes for which the joints were
purchased (use in a pipeline) and the characteristics of the joints (resistance to corrosion). Id. at
701-02. In other cases where complex goods and particular purposes were involved, the Court
stressed the fact specific nature of the inquiry into what the seller had reason to know and whether
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The Seventh Circuit implied warranty decisions highlight the risk to
a buyer that is purchasing complex goods with no "ordinary purposes"
in the trade that such goods will fail to meet particular purposes not
clearly communicated to the seller or expressed in a written agreement.
In the absence of proof of ordinary uses and purposes, or detailed com-
munication by the buyer to and reliance upon the seller, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has been unwilling to fill the gaps with implied warranties.
Although the results reached are generally sound, the Court, because of
incomplete methodology, has missed an opportunity to perfect a broader
framework within which the implied warranty of merchantability could
be understood.
C. Express Warranties: Section 2-313
Buyers have also had difficulty persuading the Court that the seller
made and breached an express warranty that complex or unique goods
would satisfy the buyer's particular purposes. Once again, the gap be-
tween the buyer's subjective expectations and what the seller objectively
represented that the goods were or would do has been too large, espe-
cially where there were no industry practices or norms to support the
buyer's expectations. 56 To add to this difficulty, the Seventh Circuit has
complicated the buyer's burden of proof by a questionable interpretation
of section 2-313.
In Royal Business Machines v. Lorraine Corp.,57 the trial court ruled
that the seller made and breached eight express warranties, allegedly
made over an eighteen-month period, about the characteristics and ca-
pacities of two copying machines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part
the buyer relied upon the seller's skill and judgment. In Royal Business Machines, 633 F.2d at 46-47,
the seller knew the buyer's particular purpose but the trial court failed to make a finding on which
copier, if either, the buyer had relied upon the seller's skill and judgment. The case was remanded
for more evidence on the buyer's "actual reliance" for each copier. In Bethlehem Steel Corp, 863
F.2d at 515-17 (7th Cir. 1988), for example, the Court affirmed a jury verdict for the seller over
buyer's claim that there was an erroneous instruction on reliance. The seller had reason to know of
the buyer's particular purpose in ordering steel. The jury, however, was instructed that the buyer
did not rely on the seller's skill and judgment when it furnished technical specifications for the
storage bins, even though the steel was originally ordered by brand name. The Court concluded,
however, that the instruction, although not perfect, did not prevent the jury from considering all of
the facts relevant to the reliance requirement in § 2-315.
56. In Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Zallea Bros., Inc., 606 F.2d 697, 700-01 (7th Cir. 1979),
the Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that there were no express warranties that the bellows
type expansion joint would protect against all corrosion agents in the buyer's thirty inch steam
pipeline. Among other things, the Court concluded that language of guarantee in a letter was not an
express warranty, especially since "there were no general industry standards regarding acceptable
steam quality and levels of chemicals and corrodents against which the performance of Zallea's
bellows could be measured." Id. at 701.
57. 633 F.2d 34, 41-45 (7th Cir. 1980).
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and reversed in part and developed a complex test, not clearly required
by section 2-313, which made it more difficult for the buyer.
First, the Court properly distinguished between affirmations by the
seller to the buyer about the goods and affirmations which were "merely
of the value of the goods" or "merely the seller's opinion or commenda-
tion of the goods." The former were express warranties under section 2-
313(1) and the latter, under section 2-312(2), were not. 58 The test, ac-
cording to the Court, is whether the seller states a fact of which the buyer
was ignorant or "merely states an opinion or judgment on a matter of
which the seller has no special knowledge and on which the buyer may
be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment." 59
This test is found in neither the text of, nor the comments to section 2-
313. Rather, comment 8 to section 2-313 states that the test for affirma-
tions of fact and affirmations of value or opinion is the same: "What
statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective judg-
ment become part of the basis of the bargain?" 6 The Court, however,
drew the line without reference to the "basis of the bargain" test.
Second, if the affirmations were express warranties under section 2-
313(1), the question is whether they became "part of the basis of the
bargain." According to the Court, this is in essence a reliance test-a
test which would be influenced over the eighteen month relationship by
the buyer's increasing knowledge of the product's shortcomings and
risks. The same affirmation made later in the relationship might not jus-
tify reasonable reliance. Since the trial court in Royal Business Machines
failed to consider the effect of time upon the buyer's reliance, the case
was remanded for further findings. The Seventh Circuit, however, did
not comment on who had what burden of proof on the remand. As a
result, the trial court could require the buyer to prove reasonable reliance
on the affirmations (the law before the UCC) rather than providing the
benefit of the presumption that all representations were part of the basis
of the bargain unless the seller produced "clear affirmative proof" that
they were not.
6 '
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 2-313 is questionable.
It ignores the suggestion, made in the comments and supported by most
58. The Court quoted § 2-313(1) in full in a footnote, but paraphrased it in the opinion. The
Court neither cited nor discussed § 2-313(2). Id. at 41.
59. Id. at 41. The test was derived from cases, some of which were decided before enactment of
Article 2. There was no attempt to relate cases cited to § 2-313 or the comments. For example,
U.C.C. § 2-313(2) comment 8 (1987), which suggests a different test, was ignored.
60. See Project, supra note 2, at 59-61 for an analysis of that language as of 1979.
61. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 (1987). The Court recognized but apparently rejected this prop-
osition in a footnote. Royal Business Mach., Inc., 633 F.2d at 44 n.7.
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commentators,62 that all affirmations about the goods made by the seller
to the buyer should be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain.
Proof by the buyer of actual reliance is not required. Rather, the burden
is on the seller to establish by "clear and affirmative proof" that the
statements were not part of the buyer's bargain. One aspect of that proof
may be that the buyer did not rely in fact or that purported reliance was
unreasonable. But the burden should be on the seller to establish the
negative, rather than the other way around.63 If this view were accepted,
the district court's failure to make certain findings would be fatal to the
seller rather than the buyer.
D. Misuse of the Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2-202
Resort to section 2-313 may not be needed when a written agree-
ment is clear and detailed enough about the contract's essential elements.
The written contract, without more, establishes the standard for con-
formity and the terms are clearly part of the bargain. In these situations,
however, disputes over interpretation may arise.
Such a case is Binks Manufacturing Co. v. National Presto Indus-
tries, Inc.,64 where a dispute over the "maximum capacity" of an indus-
trial spray system arose. Although the dispute appeared to involve
interpretation of terms in the writing, the Court applied the parol evi-
dence rule in section 2-202 to exclude evidence from earlier negotiations
and course of performance that was arguably relevant to explain the
meaning of those terms. Stressing that the parol evidence rule was a
"rule of law," the Court concluded that the extrinsic evidence was not in
harmony with the language of the writing and should be excluded. 65
Although the line is difficult to draw, the Court took the wrong ap-
proach to the parol evidence rule. By excluding evidence introduced to
interpret rather than to add to or vary terms in the writing, the Court
ignored the language of and the comments to section 2-202 and an ac-
62. For a then contemporaneous discussion, not cited by the Court, see Project, supra note 2, at
50-67. For more recent commentary, see, e.g., Murray, "Basis of the Bargain ": Transcending Classi-
cal Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283 (1982); Coffey, Creating Express Warranties Under the UCC
Basis of the Bargain-Don't Rely on It, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 115 (1987).
63. Royal Business Mach., 633 F.2d at 44 n.7. The Court bootstrapped itself into the "reliance"
test. Although citing comments 3 and 8 to § 2-313, the Court quoted not the comments but the
paraphrase of them in Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 770
(3d Cir. 1978). That paraphrase concluded that a reliance test was required, a conclusion that has
been hotly debated. See Project, supra note 2, at 53-54. This debate and the criticism of Sessa were
not revealed in the opinion.
64. 709 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 1114-17.
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cepted limitation on the exclusionary rule.66 By explaining section 2-202
as a rule of law rather than the product of the parties' intention, the
Court undercut the consensual underpinnings of the rule itself. The re-
sult, in that case at least, was a highly questionable victory for the seller.
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY
When the buyer has accepted goods and has not revoked accept-
ance,67 and the seller has made and breached a warranty, the buyer's
"direct" damages are computed by the "difference at the time and place
of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they
would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount. ' 68 Section 2-
714(3) states that in a "proper case any incidental and consequential
damages... may also be recovered. . ." under section 2-715. Incidental
damages include reasonable expenses incurred by the buyer after the
breach to effect substitute remedies, preserve the seller's goods and
otherwise mitigate damages. 69 Where loss other than injury to person or
property is involved, consequential damages compensate for the loss of
use of the promised performance. Section 2-715(2)(a), however, limits
consequential recovery to "any loss resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise ... ." Lurking in the text of section 2-715(2)(a), therefore, is
the omnipresent ghost of Hadley v. Baxendale 70 and an enhanced "duty"
to mitigate damages.
In general, once it is established that a warranty was made and
breached, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the remedy provisions
of Article 2 has been more favorable to the buyer than its decisions on
whether a warranty was made or breached.
66. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33,
442 P.2d 641 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 comment b (1980); U.C.C.
§ 2-202 comment 1 (1987).
67. If the buyer rightfully rejects the goods, U.C.C. § 2-601 (1987), or justifiably revokes ac-
ceptance, id. § 2-608, the catalogue of remedies listed in § 2-711(1) becomes available. See U.C.C.
§ 2-608(3) (1987). In addition, the buyer may recover incidental and consequential damages under
§ 2-715.
68. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1987). The presence of "special circumstances" invites the court to find
another way to measure "direct" damages.
69. Id. § 2-715(1).
70. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Under the Hadley test, the damages, if they did not arise "natu-
rally.., from such breach of contract ...," must be such "as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of
the breach of it" (emphasis added). This "foreseeability" test is relaxed in U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a)
(1987). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1980).
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A. Direct Damages: Section 2-714(2)
In Continental Sand & Gravel v. K & K Sand & Gravel,71 the seller
sold equipment expressly warranted to be in "good order, condition and
repair" for $50,000.72 In fact, the equipment, although operable, was not
in good repair and the seller did not correct the deficiency. The buyer
spent $23,000 in partial repairs and then shifted to an alternative method
of operation. The total estimated cost to repair was $164,000. The seller
argued that the value of the goods as warranted was limited by the con-
tract price. The trial court, however, used the total cost of repair as the
value the goods "would have had if they had been as warranted" and
awarded the buyer the difference between $164,000 and the market value
of the goods as delivered.
Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the re-
sult was proper under section 2-714(2) and "general commercial law."
73
After noting that it was not unusual for the value of the goods as war-
ranted to exceed the contract price, the Court stated that "[t]his result is
logical, since to limit recoverable damages by the purchase price . . .
would clearly deprive the purchaser of the benefit of its bargain in cases
in which the value of the goods as warranted exceeds the price."
'74
Assuming that the repair costs, if incurred, were reasonable, the re-
sult clearly squares with the policy of section 1-106(1) and is consistent
with the language of section 2-714(2), read in context. Repair costs are
also an analogue for "cover" under section 2-712, a remedy which the
Court noted was not available to a buyer of accepted goods.75 They pro-
tect the buyer's reasonable efforts to repair and, in effect, to obtain goods
of the quality warranted by the seller. Cost of repair, therefore, is an
important method by which to measure the value of the goods "as war-
ranted" under section 2-714(2) and the Court's conclusion is clearly
sound.76 One would prefer, however, an opinion that drew and elabo-
71. 755 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1985).
72. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that express warranties, clearly made, were
breached. The trial court considered evidence of trade usage, among other things, to determine that
the goods were not in "good" order. Id. at 91-92.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id. at 91, 92.
75. Id. at 92 n.5. By cover, the buyer makes a "reasonable purchase of... goods in substitution
for those due from the seller," U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (1987), and recovers as damages the "difference
between the cost of cover and the contract price .... " id. § 2-712(2). It is only available when the
buyer has properly rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods. Id. § 2-71 l(l)(a).
76. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at § 10-2. The subtrahend in § 2-714(2) (1987)
is always the market value of the goods delivered, i.e., the nonconforming goods. The contract price
is only presumptive evidence of the value of the goods as warranted. In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982),
an opinion from the Third Circuit cited by the Court, the market value of the computer system
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rated its conclusions more from the text and policy of Article 2 rather
than from "logic" and "general commercial law." Rather than discuss-
ing sections 1-106(1), 2-711(1), 2-712 and 2-714, the Court, once again,
indulged in rather spare Code methodology.
77
B. Consequential Damages: Section 2-715(2)(a)
Section 2-715(2)(a) relaxed the common law foreseeability require-
ment announced in Hadley v. Baxendale and its progeny.78  Under the
Code, consequential damages "resulting from the seller's breach include
... any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs
of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know . .. ."
Thus, the Seventh Circuit, with little fanfare, has generally permitted a
commercial buyer to claim lost profits resulting from the inability to use
the goods as planned. The primary issue in these cases is whether the
buyer has proved losses of which the seller had reason to know with
reasonable certainty. The answer varies with the quantity and quality of
the evidence presented.
79
An exception which emphasizes the lack of "reason to know" is
Chrysler Corp. v. E. Shavitz & Sons,80 where the Seventh Circuit reversed
a judgment by the trial court for damages stemming from loss of good
will. The seller breached by making late and defective deliveries of
equipment that the buyer had agreed to install in commercial buildings
for third persons. The disruptions upset the third persons and they re-
fused to deal with the buyer again. The buyer claimed that the profits
lost from the subsequent refusals to deal were recoverable as consequent-
ial damages under section 2-715(2)(a).
actually delivered was $6,000, the contract price was $46,020, and the market value of a computer
system as warranted by the seller was $207,826.50. The court affirmed a judgment for $201,826.50,
the difference between $6,000 and the value of the computer system that should have been delivered.
77. The Court has not had the opportunity to consider either the scope of incidental damages
under § 2-715(1) or when "special circumstances" show damages of an amount different from the
formula in § 2-714(2).
78. See, e.g., Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989).
79. See, e.g., Hoefferle Truck Sales v. Divco-Wayne, 523 F.2d 543, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1975)
(where seller delayed delivery, jury verdict for profits lost on resale of new trucks and warranty
repairs, established from evidence of diminished volume and operating costs, reinstated); Cates v.
Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17, 21-22 (7th Cir. 1979) (Court reversed trial court rulings
on proof of consequential damages as too restrictive and requiring excessive certainty: damages
should depend upon a "fair and reasonable" estimate after a broader consideration of all the evi-
dence, including occupancy rates before and after the breach). But see Continental Sand & Gravel v.
K & K Sand & Gravel, 755 F.2d 87, 91-92 (7th Cir. 1985) (Court affirmed trial court ruling against
consequential damages, where plaintiff failed to prove the amount of sand that it actually processed
during the relevant time period, "a figure that must be compared to the amount that should have
been processed if the.., equipment had been as warranted").
80. 536 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1976).
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In rejecting the buyer's contention, the Court almost, but not quite,
held that damages from loss of good will were not recoverable as a mat-
ter of law. Instead, the Court concluded that the seller, who had no
previous dealings with the buyer, had "no reason to foresee" that the
breach would result in lost profits from reduced future demand for the
buyer's services, especially where at the time of contracting, "no other
jobs existed or were within the offing." Thus, the "consequential damages
claimed ... were totally speculative and did not arise naturally from the
breach itself."'
C. Mitigation of Damages
A further limitation on the recovery of consequential damages is the
"mitigation of damages" principle, explicitly imposed by section 2-
715(2)(a) which provides that consequential damages do not include
losses "which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise."
'82
In Cates v. Morgan Portable Building Corp.,83 the question presented
was whether the buyer had reasonably avoided consequential damages
(lost profits) resulting from defective modular units intended to expand
his motel business. More specifically, the question was whether any
losses incurred during the time between after the seller's first promise to
repair expired and a second promise to repair was made were recoverable
where both parties had an "equal opportunity" to mitigate.
The Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Posner, held they were
not. The Court first noted that although the UCC required the buyer to
mitigate damages,84 it did not say who had the burden of proof. Under
Illinois law, however, the burden was on the seller to prove that the
buyer had not mitigated and Illinois law controlled. Next, the Court,
again reasoning without reference to or assistance from Article 2, held
that the buyer's responsibility to mitigate, normally arising at the time of
breach, was suspended if, after the breach, the seller promised to repair
the goods. The buyer's mitigation responsibility, however, arose again at
81. Id. at 744-46. The Court, for once, actually quoted § 2-715(2)(a) in the text of the opinion
and stated the issue precisely in terms of the statutory language. The Court relied upon Neville
Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970), which, applying Pennsylvania
law, rejected loss of good will because it did not arise from the buyer's "inability ... to use specific
property destroyed, damaged or withheld by a defendant's wrong .... " For a discussion of cases
permitting the recovery of good will, see Update, supra note 2, at 1250-52.
82. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1987).
83. Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1985). For the first Cates
opinion, see Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1979).
84. In support for this, the Court cited the comment to § 1-106(1) but not the explicit language
of § 2-715(2)(a). Cates, 780 F.2d at 688.
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the time when the buyer should have known that the seller would not
repair. 85
Finally, the Court rejected the buyer's argument that where the par-
ties have an "equal opportunity" to mitigate, damages should not be re-
duced for losses that the seller could have avoided. On the contrary,
since the buyer was in the best position, cost and other factors consid-
ered, to make repairs or purchase substitutes, and those costs could be
recovered from the seller,86 the responsibility to mitigate was on the
buyer. The Court reasoned:
Contract law seeks to preserve the buyer's incentive to consider a wide
range of possible methods of mitigation of damages, by imposing a
duty to mitigate even if some of the possibilities are equally within the
seller's power. This incentive would be lost if Morgan's ability to re-
pair its defective units-only one method, and maybe not the cheapest
method, of reducing the Cateses' consequential damages-excused the
Cateses from all duty of mitigation.87
However sensible this result may be, the opinion omits relevant Code
sections and does not discuss cases to the contrary., Rather than root-
ing a reasonable conclusion in the language and policy of Article 2, the
Court treated Article 2 as if it were just another source to consider. This
approach both ignored the complexities of the Article 2 analysis89 and
missed an opportunity to develop a more complete approach to analyze
how the mitigation principle fits into disputes over warranty liability and
remedy.90
V. EFFECT OF AGREEMENTS DISCLAIMING WARRANTIES OR
LIMITING REMEDIES
A. The "Limited Warranty Package"
In the prototype transaction before the Court, the seller has manu-
factured or designed complex, expensive machinery to meet the ordinary
85. The trial court had concluded that the time was six months and this was affirmed as an
"informed and sensible guess .... Id. at 687.
86. Id. at 688-89. These costs, presumably, would be incidental damages, although the Court
cited no authority. See U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (1987).
87. Cates, 780 F.2d at 689-90. The Court concluded, however, that the buyer's failure to miti-
gate during the six month period did not bar consequential damages forever. Once the seller made a
fresh promise to repair, the duty to mitigate was again suspended during that new period.
88. See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1978), where
the court, in an alternative holding, adopted the "equal opportunity" doctrine: "Where both the
plaintiff and the defendant have had equal opportunity to reduce the damages by the same act and it
is equally reasonable to expect the defendant to minimize damages, the defendant is in no position to
contend that the plaintiff failed to mitigate."
89. See Update, supra note 2, at 1252-56.
90. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 39-53.
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and not so ordinary purposes of the buyer. In this setting, as already
discussed, the buyer has had difficulty in proving that the seller made and
breached any warranty, express or implied. If a warranty was made and
breached, however, the buyer has had success in recovering direct and, to
a lesser extent, consequential damages.
The buyer's risks are high in these transactions. If the goods fail to
conform to a warranty, the buyer bears both the initial burden of ob-
taining conforming goods9 and the business disruption caused from the
inability to use the goods. That these losses will be fully compensated is
not a foregone conclusion. In this setting, many sellers have been suc-
cessful in obtaining buyer assent to what we will call a "limited warranty
package. '9 2 This "package" typically has four elements.
First, the seller makes a limited express warranty that the goods are
free from defects in material or workmanship at the time of delivery or
installation. By inclusion in a writing signed by the buyer, this express
warranty clearly becomes "part of the basis of the bargain."
Second, the seller disclaims all other warranties express or implied.
A disclaimer assumes that a warranty made or imposed at one point in
the transaction can be contracted away at a later time. Article 2 permits
disclaimers of implied warranties,93 but section 2-316(2) imposes explicit
conditions upon such disclaimers. Thus, "to exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous
"94
Third, the parties agree to a limited, exclusive 95 remedy if the seller
breaches the express warranty. The seller agrees to repair or replace de-
fects in material or workmanship within a stated period of time. Fre-
quently, other limitations are agreed upon, such as imposing the contract
price as an outer limit on damages. These limitations are, in general,
permitted by section 2-719, subject to a requirement that there "be at
least a fair quantum of remedy for breach .... -96
Fourth, the seller may, either as part of, or separate from, the
"package," exclude any liability for consequential damages, whether
91. The seller has a limited power but not a legal obligation to "cure" a nonconforming tender.
U.C.C. § 2-508 (1987).
92. I have found no reported cases where a seller agreed to give the buyer more protection than
that afforded by Article 2.
93. Disclaimers of express warranties are not permitted. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1987). Cf U.C.C.
§ 2-202 (1987).
94. Id. § 2-316(2). The terms "writing" and "conspicuous" are defined in § 1-201.
95. An exclusive limited remedy is "the sole remedy." Id. § 2-719(l)(b).
96. Id. § 2-719 comment 1.
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caused by breach of warranty, or the obligation to repair and replace, or
by tort. Where commercial losses are involved, these clauses excluding
consequential damages are, when included without the "package," en-
forceable unless they are unconscionable.
97
In commercial deals, this exclusive "package" has at least three jus-
tifications: (1) The seller has an incentive to price the product without
including contingencies for consequential damages; (2) The buyer under-
stands that it must take precautions, either before or after the breach, to
avoid consequential losses; and (3) An implicit "trade off" is that the
buyer agrees to assume greater risks because the seller promises to
"cure" any non-conformity within a reasonable time.
How has the Court dealt with issues arising in and around the "war-
ranty package"? By and large, the results reinforce the pattern of deci-
sions in the Seventh Circuit favoring the seller.
B. Some Discrete Issues
1. Battle of the Forms
The "package" or discrete segments of it, such as disclaimers and
excluders of consequential damages, are usually contained in standard
forms prepared by the seller. The question whether these terms have
become part of the contract frequently involves a "battle of the forms"
and, thus, requires a confrontation with section 2-207. In this confronta-
tion, the seller usually prevails in the Seventh Circuit.
In Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor,98 the buyer's offer form said
nothing about consequential damages, but the seller's acknowledgment
form contained clauses disclaiming warranties and excluding liability for
consequential damages. The goods were accepted without objection by
the buyer and, later, defects were discovered.
The Seventh Circuit held that the seller's standard form terms were
97. Id. § 2-719(3). For an early example of a "package" not fully in compliance with § 2-
316(2), see V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1971).
98. 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985). Seller contracted to sell transmissions to buyer for installa-
tion in large farm tractors made by buyer. A third party contracted with seller to supply electronic
shift controllers. Problems with the shift controllers caused delays in delivery of the transmissions to
buyer. As a result, buyer lost two seasons and was unable, despite efforts to sell the inventory, to
avoid bankruptcy. Seller then sued for the unpaid price ($1 million). Buyer filed a counterclaim
seeking $53 million damages and brought a third party action for $49 million against the manufac-
turer of the controllers. Buyer claimed breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, strict
liability and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to seller and third party
on all negligence and strict liability claims against both parties and dismissed the warranty claim
against the third party for lack of privity. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment for seller for
the price, which was offset by damages caused buyer by seller's failure to deliver or repair on time.
This was a breach of contract, not a breach of warranty. The decision was affirmed on appeal.
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part of a contract formed under section 2-207(1) by the seller's "definite
acceptance." Although they constituted "material" additional terms
under section 2-207(2)(b), the buyer had "expressly assented" to them by
a course of dealing and conduct after the goods were delivered. The fail-
ure of the parties to expressly discuss the clauses was not fatal. Rather,
the buyer's actual knowledge of, and conduct which invoked the express
warranty contained in the writing with the disclaimer and excluder
clauses was sufficient. 99 In short, the buyer, because of what it had rea-
son to know, was not unfairly surprised and, therefore, its manifested
assent without objection to the limiting clauses was binding.100
The issue was more complicated in Western Industries, Inc. v.
Newcor Canada, Ltd.101 The buyer's offer form required, while a form
sent by the seller excluded consequential damages. They were "differ-
ent" rather than additional terms, therefore not fitting the language of
section 2-207(2). The seller also tried to introduce evidence of a trade
custom negating consequential damages. The trial court excluded the
evidence of custom and held that the contract between the parties was
formed six days before the seller's form was mailed. Consequently, that
form did not become part of the contract under section 2-207.
The Seventh Circuit, speaking through Judge Posner, reversed on
the ground that the trial court had improperly excluded evidence of trade
custom and evidence relevant to when the contract was formed. He con-
cluded that if the contract were formed at the earlier date, the excluder
clause in the seller's form was not effective, even though the trade usage
might be. In that case, however, the seller's requirement of consequential
damages, which was part of the contract, would conflict with the custom.
This conflict would arise only if the contract were formed at the earlier
time.
99. Id. at 1334-35. Cf. Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that an arbitration clause, which was not a material additional term under § 2-207(2)
but did not unfairly surprise the buyer, became part of the agreement).
100. One of U.C.C. § 2-207's many shortcomings is the failure to say when, if ever, a material,
additional term under § 2-207(2) becomes part of the bargain. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 3 (1987)
states that "they will not be included unless expressly agreed to by the other party" and this lan-
guage has figured in many of the decisions. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 36-38.
101. 739 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984). Buyer had a contract to supply cavities for microwave ovens
to a foreign manufacturer. Buyer agreed with the resale buyer to use projection welding for the
cavities, a method not used in the United States. Buyer then purchased from Seller several custom
made welding machines for the project, machines that had not been built before. After extended
discussions and the exchange of forms, the machines were built and, because of American safety
standards, were unusable. Seller rebuilt them, but one year delay in use resulted. There was no issue
over the existence and breach of warranty. Seller sued for the unpaid price and buyer counter-
claimed for consequential damages. The jury awarded buyer $1.3 million on the counterclaim and
seller the unpaid price. On appeal, both verdicts were reversed and case was remanded.
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Judge Cudahy, concurring, agreed that the trade custom evidence
was improperly excluded and argued that if the contract were formed at
the later date, the conflicting forms would "fall out" under section 2-
207(3), thus leaving a gap in the agreement to be filled, presumably by
the trade usage. This was a possibility which Judge Posner did not ex-
plicitly consider.
In my opinion, Judge Cudahy was correct in his reading of section
2-207, when "different" material terms collide after some contract is
formed under section 2-207(1), both should drop out, leaving a gap in the
agreement to be filled under the formula in section 2-207(3). 102 The criti-
cal issue for both judges, however, was the time when the contract was
formed and the potential effect of a trade usage negating consequential
damages. Under Judge Posner's assumption that the contract was
formed earlier, the evidence if admitted would still collide with the
seller's express requirement of consequential damages. Under Judge
Cudahy's assumption that the contract was formed later, the seller's re-
quirement would have dropped out and the custom, if otherwise prova-
ble, would simply fill the gap and become part of the agreement. 0 3
2. Disclaimers
Assuming that the disclaimer is part of the contract, the Court has
had few occasions to evaluate the enforceability of the seller's attempt to
disclaim express and implied warranties under section 2-316. Early deci-
sions approved without discussion disclaimers of implied warranties not
meeting the conditions of section 2-316(2). 104
In Twin Disc, Inc.,0 5 the Court was presented with a disclaimer that
clearly was not "conspicuous." It was in small print on the back of a
standard form. 106 Nevertheless, the buyer had actual knowledge of it
and, presumably, was not surprised. The Court stated that there is "no
need to determine whether a disclaimer is conspicuous ...when the
buyer has actual knowledge of the disclaimer"'10 7 and thus enforced the
disclaimer.
102. So holding is Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984). But see J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 31-36, who disagree with each other.
103. For a proposed solution to the § 2-207 mess, see Murray, A Proposed Revision of§ 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J. L. & COM. 337 (1986).
104. E.g., V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 1971).
105. 772 F.2d at 1329.
106. Under U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1987), a "term of clause is conspicuous when it is so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." See Update, supra
note 2, at 1266-72.
107. Twin Disc, Inc., 772 F.2d at 1335, n.3.
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This result ignores the objective requirement of section 2-316(2),
which states that a disclaimer in writing "must" be "conspicuous" and,
in the process, the cases which have reached a contrary result. 108 Under
this regulatory subsection, form is important both to insure the consis-
tent communication of essential information and to avoid evidentiary
conflicts over how much the buyer actually knew.'°9 Since the issue and
the alternatives were not fully discussed, Twin Discs is another dubious
decision which favors the seller.
3. Agreed Exclusion of Consequential Damages
Under section 2-715(2)(a), a buyer may recover consequential dam-
ages for a seller's repudiation or failure to deliver and for breach of war-
ranty. Under section 2-719(1)(a), the agreement between the parties
may, among other things, "limit or alter the measure of damages recov-
erable" under Article 2. More specifically, section 2-719(3) provides that
"[c]onsequential damages maybe limited or excluded unless the limita-
tion or exclusion is unconscionable . . . " and that a limitation of dam-
ages where the loss is commercial is not prima facie unconscionable. The
comments suggest that agreements limiting remedies must permit "at
least minimum adequate remedies" or a "fair quantum of remedy" and
that clauses excluding consequential damages "may not operate in an
unconscionable manner.""
0
The Seventh Circuit has enforced clauses excluding consequential
damages where the buyer has manifested assent and unconscionability
was not established. In V-M Corp., the Court, in enforcing an excluder,
stated that section 2-719 was intended to "encourage and facilitate con-
sensual allocations of risks.., where commercial, rather than consumer
sales are involved.""'
This pro-excluder policy was put to the test in Western Industries,
Inc. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd.," 2 where the seller sought to introduce evi-
dence of a "custom" in the specialty welding trade of excluding conse-
quential damages for breach of warranty and of limiting the remedy to
return of the purchase price. Absent proof of unconscionability, such a
108. See Update, supra note 2, at 1270-71.
109. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, at 502, who argue that deviations from the
formal requirement "would reward the convincing liar .
110. U.C.C. § 2-719 comments I and 3 (1987).
111. 447 F.2d at 869. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1987) comment 3 states that excluders "are merely an
allocation of unknown or undeterminable risks." See also Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation,
Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969) (seller excludes liability for consequential damages for delay in
delivering an experimental aircraft).
112. 739 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1984), discussed supra at note 101.
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"custom" would clearly be enforceable if manifested in a clause con-
tained in the written contract for sale.113 The trial court excluded the
evidence and the Seventh Circuit reversed, with Judge Cudahy concur-
ring in the result. Based upon the preferred evidence, the policy favoring
exclusion clauses and the increased damage exposure of the seller if there
were no exclusion,114 the Court concluded that "a rational jury could
have concluded that, yes, it was the custom for manufacturers of spe-
cialty welding machines not to be liable for consequential damages."' 15
The trial court was, therefore, reversed and the case remanded.
The "custom" issue raises problems that the Court did not fully ad-
dress. Judge Posner was probably correct in concluding that evidence of
"custom" was not excluded simply because the limited remedy was not
mentioned in the written agreement. A fair reading of section 2-
719(l)(a) does not support this result, especially since the definition of
"agreement" in Article 1 includes "usage of trade."' 16 As Judge Cudahy
argued, however, the Court should have instructed the lower court on
the limitations upon trade usage imposed by section 1-205, a section cited
by the majority but not elaborated upon.'" 7 Section 1-205(1), for exam-
ple, provides a statutory definition of trade usage (the word "custom" is
not used) and section 1-205(3) makes it clear when one party to the deal
is bound by such usage, i.e., when they are "engaged" in the trade or
vocation or they "are or should be aware" of the usage.
More importantly, section 1-205(3) states that trade usage is to be
used to "give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of
an agreement." But suppose that the contract contains no term on con-
sequential damages or a term providing that consequential damages are
required. Can trade usage be admitted to supply an entirely new term or
to contradict a term in the contract? These are important questions"
8
which were, apparently, left to the discretion of the same trial court
whose decision was just reversed for two errors in excluding evidence.
Arguably, this was precisely the case where complete Code methodology
113. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1987).
114. In discussing the effect of breach, the Court noted that § 2-715(2) adopted an "especially
liberal stand" toward consequential damages.
115. Id. at 1204.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1208 (Cudahy, J., concurring). The Court cites § 1-205(2) to establish that the exist-
ence of trade usage is a question of fact and § 1-205(3) on when the buyer might not be bound by a
usage even though proved. Id. at 1201-02.
118. See generally Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express
Terms, " and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 N.C.L. REV. 777
(1986).
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and some direction by the Seventh Circuit on how to read a statute was
required.
C. Failure of Essential Purpose
In the "warranty package," the exclusive limited remedy for breach
of the express warranty is that the seller will "repair or replace" the de-
fects in material and workmanship within a stated or reasonable period
of time. The implicit tradeoff is that the seller will undertake an obliga-
tion to "cure," and the buyer will assume the risk of both direct and
consequential damages during that period. An important question, fre-
quently litigated, is the effect of the seller's failure to "cure" within the
time specified. What remedies are available to the buyer upon this sec-
ond breach by the seller?
The debate has centered around section 2-719(2), which provides:
"Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act." Two
important questions therefore are presented: (1) When does a limited,
exclusive remedy "fail of its essential purpose"; and (2) If the remedy
fails, may the buyer recover consequential damages even though the con-
tract contains an excluder clause which otherwise would be enforceable
under section 2-719(3)?119
In V-M Corp.,1 20 the Seventh Circuit conceded that a breach by the
seller of its obligation to cure might cause the remedy to fail its essential
purpose and cases from other jurisdictions are in accord. The seller,
however, had fully performed the agreed limited remedy and there was
thus no occasion to apply section 2-719(2). Even so, the Court exhibited
a strong reluctance to negate a commercial risk allocation "[e]ven where
the defects.., cause substantial difficulties to those involved in wholesale
and retail distribution." There was no evidence that the defects, which
had been cured, "caused a failure of consideration for the distributorship
agreement as such which would justify altering the particular allocation
of these costs by making the manufacturer the insurer of distributor prof-
119. A subsidiary question is what direct damage remedies are available. For example, can the
buyer now revoke acceptance and cover under § 2-712? For the seminal article on this problem, see
Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UC.C. § 2-719(2)
(1987), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28 (1977).
120. 447 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1971). The dispute arose after the termination of a wholesale distrib-
utorship agreement, under which the buyer had distributed for over 12 years electronic equipment
made by the seller. The buyer claimed that product quality had decreased, making the distributor-
ship unprofitable. One issue was how much buyer owed seller for goods accepted before the termina-
tion. The trial court dismissed six counterclaims by buyer based upon a claimed breach of warranty
(seeking lost profits and extra expenditures) and the jury found against the buyer on the setoff. Held,
affirmed: The seller may recover $26,333 without any offset.
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its and extraordinary expenses."1 21
The analysis was advanced in AES Technology Systems, Inc. v. Co-
herent Radiation,1 22 where the seller breached an express warranty in the
sale of a laser and failed, over an eleven month period, to correct the
problem. The Court, speaking through Judge Moore, 123 concluded that
the limited remedy had failed its essential purpose even though the
breach was neither willful nor negligent. Did this failure mean that the
buyer could recover consequential damages even though there was an
excluder clause in the contract? The Court held no, reversed the trial
court and remanded the case for a determination of direct damages.
For Judge Moore, the issue was not unconscionability of the ex-
cluder but whether the seller's double breach deprived the buyer of "a
substantial benefit of the bargain." Because of a stipulation, this question
was to be answered under the provisions of the official text of the UCC
rather than the legislation adopted and interpreted by either California or
Illinois.124 This meant that the Court was, despite Illinois law to the
contrary, freer to conclude, as it did, that the excluder clause did not fall
automatically if the limited remedy failed its essential purpose.
125
Rather, it held that a court must examine the "individual factual situa-
tion," keeping in mind the judicial objective not to "rewrite contracts by
ignoring parties' intent ... " but to "interpret the existing contract as
fairly as possible when all events did not occur as planned."1 26 On the
facts, the Court concluded that the buyer was to assume the risk involved
with the project, subject to recovery of the minimum adequate remedy,
i.e., direct damages, mandated by section 2-719.
Judge Moore's flexible interpretation of section 2-719 indulges a pre-
sumption in favor of the excluder clause. It also permits the identifica-
tion of extremes which, in turn, indicate probable outcomes.
First, the strongest case for the "double breaching" seller is where
(a) the seller has made a good faith but unsuccessful effort to cure, and
the defect was not substantial or, if it was, the buyer could obtain restitu-
tion of the price or direct damages, or (b) the excluder clause was posi-
121. Id. at 869.
122. 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978).
123. Sitting by designation from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
124. Since the parties agreed that the provisions of the U.C.C. in California and Illinois were the
same, the Court interpreted the sections of the Official Text of the U.C.C. rather than the those of
the "individual statutes." Id. at 938 n.2.
125. The Court cited and rejected Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1
(1970), apparently holding that under Illinois law the excluder clause automatically dropped out.
AES Technology Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d at 940 n.7.
126. 583 F.2d at 941.
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tioned apart from the "package" in clear, conspicuous language and
would otherwise pass muster under the unconscionability test in section
2-719(3). 127
Second, the strongest case for the buyer is (a) where the excluder is
intended to be an integral part of the "warranty package" and the limited
remedy fails its essential purpose,128 or (b) where the defect is substantial,
the seller has made no or an unreasonable effort to cure, and no other
adequate remedy is available. 129 The first element depends upon contract
interpretation and the second element depends, in essence, upon the ab-
sence of unconscionability and the need for good faith and minimum ade-
quate remedies in the exchange.
Between the extremes, results in particular cases must turn on the
weighing of various factors in individual cases. In the Seventh Circuit,
this leaves the buyer to fight an uphill battle.
130
In AES Technology Systems, the Seventh Circuit, with the concur-
rence of the parties, purported to develop the best interpretation of sec-
tion 2-719(2) from the Official Text of the UCC. In Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Maryland v. Krebs Engineers,'3' however, the Court concluded
that it was bound by Wisconsin's interpretation of section 2-719(2),
which was strikingly different from that developed in AES Technology.
Speaking through Judge Manion, the Court concluded that in Wisconsin,
the clause excluding consequential damages would drop automatically if
the limited remedy failed its essential purpose and that this deletion did
not depend upon whether the buyer had any other adequate remedy.
3 2
Thus, the remedies "as provided in this Act" included consequential
damages under section 2-715(2)(a).
There is a certain irony in the Erie machinations in AES Technology
and Fidelity & Deposit Co. In the latter, Judge Manion worked hard to
127. See, e.g., Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1983).
128. See, e.g., Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985), holding that the
parties did not intend to exclude consequential damages from a lost soybean crop where the seller,
despite promises to cure, did not repair the tractor in time.
129. See Samuels, The Unconscionability of Excluding Consequential Damages Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code When No Other Meaningful Remedy is Available, 43 U. PrIr. L. REV. 197
(1981). See also Mather, Consequential Damages When Exclusive Repair Remedies Fail: Uniform
Commericial Code Section 2-719, 38 S.C.L. REV. 673 (1987).
130. See Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of
Consequential Damages:" An Objective Approach, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 551 (1987).
131. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Krebs Engs., 859 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Wisconsin
law).
132. Id. at 504-05. The Wisconsin case is Murray v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 83 Wis. 2d 406,
414-19, 265 N.W.2d 513, 517-20 (1978). In reaching this result, the Court rejected decisions from
other states espousing the factorial analysis employed in AES Technology (the "majority" view).
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apply the Wisconsin interpretation of section 2-719(2), without regard to
whether it was the best interpretation. In the former, Judge Moore, free
of the constraints of local law, worked hard to develop an interpretation
of section 2-719(2) which, arguably, was inconsistent with Illinois law. 133
The position of the buyer in the Seventh Circuit is, therefore, somewhat
uncertain and not likely to be determined under the "best" interpretation
of the statute.1
34
VI. THE PRIvITY DEFENSE AND THE TORT INTRUSION
A. The Privity Defense
In addition to defenses based upon agreement, i.e., disclaimers and
agreed limited remedies, Article 2 imposes another 35 important contract
defense to a breach of warranty claim: There must be privity of contract
between the seller and buyer.
Article 2 requires privity in warranty disputes unless the warranty
has been extended to remote purchasers or users by some version of sec-
tion 2-318136 or by judicial decision. 137 In commercial disputes where no
133. See Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970), which, arguably, is
inconsistent with the result reached by the Court.
134. See Update, supra note 2, at 1302-10.
135. Two other defenses may also be available. The first is where the buyer has failed to give the
seller notice of the breach "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach .... " U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1987). The penalty is that the buyer is "barred from any rem-
edy." There have been no major decisions on this issue in the Seventh Circuit. But see, however,
AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 1978), where the
Court held that the buyer had given adequate notice under § 2-607(3)(a).
The second is where the suit for breach of warranty was not "commenced within four years
after the cause of action has accrued." U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1987). A cause of action accrues for
breach of warranty when the "breach occurs," i.e., "when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach
must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered." U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1987).
There have been no decisions of consequence in the Seventh Circuit interpreting U.C.C. § 2-725
(1987). See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago E. Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1988)
(seller's counterclaim filed more than four years after goods delivered preserved by special Illinois
counterclaim statute of limitations, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110 para. 13-207); Stumler v. Ferry-Morse
Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 1981) (express warranty did not explicitly run to future
performance).
136. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1987) provides three alternatives for the states to enact. Alternative A,
which has been enacted in Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin, and Alternative B, deal with claims for
personal injuries. The best possibility for the buyer is Alternative C, which provides that a "seller's
warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty." Variations
which explicitly protect remote purchasers from economic loss have also been enacted. See Speidel,
supra note 2, at 36 n.97.
137. A leading decision is Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d
660 (1985) (dictum).
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damage to person or property has resulted, Indiana, 138 Illinois139 and
Wisconsin' 40 still require privity of contract. Thus, a disappointed buyer
must, in most cases, pursue contract remedies against the immediate
seller rather than the manufacturer of the nonconforming product.1 41
The Seventh Circuit, mindful of Erie, has been careful to defer to local
policy on this important defense.142
Some of the issues in this area are illustrated by Collins Co., Ltd. v.
Carboline Co. ' 4 3 Carboline, the supplier and installer of roofing material,
made an express ten-year warranty to the owner of the building against
leakage. Later, the owner sold the building to the plaintiff Collins. At
the time of sale, an inspection showed no problems with the roof. There-
after, when leaks developed within the ten year period, the owner as-
signed to the plaintiff its rights under the express warranty. Collins then
sued Carboline for breach of express warranty, claiming damages in ex-
cess of $5 million. The district court ruled that under Illinois law, privity
of contract was required and was not present on the facts.44 On appeal,
the Court certified to the Illinois Supreme Court the question of whether
the assignment, under section 2-210(2), satisfied the privity requirement.
Judge Cudahy concurred, but thought it clear that privity was present
and that the suit could be maintained.
The Illinois Supreme Court answered the certified question in the
affirmative: An "assignee of a warrantee's rights under an express war-
ranty, if the assignment is otherwise valid, succeeds to all those rights
and thus stands in privity with the warrantor." 145 The Court concluded
138. See Greenberg, Vertical Privity and Damages for Breach of Implied Warranty Under the
UC.C.: It's Time for Indiana to Abandon the Citadel, 21 IND. L. REV. 23 (1988).
139. See Collins Co., Ltd. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834 (1988) (finding an
exception to the privity requirement where first buyer has assigned an express warranty to a second
buyer who then sues the seller).
140. The authorities are reviewed in Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg,
Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989) (dictum).
141. A case for the abolition of privity in this setting is developed in Speidel, supra note 2, at 35-
52.
142. See, e.g., Corbin v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff was a
third-hand consumer purchaser of an above ground swimming pool manufactured by seller. Plaintiff
was injured in person after a deep dive in a shallow pool and sued seller in tort and for breach of
warranty under the U.C.C. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller on the war-
ranty claim under Indiana law for the lack of privity. The Court affirmed on the grounds that
Indiana law required privity in breach of warranty claims under the U.C.C. The Indiana version of
§ 2-318, Alternative A, extended the warranty horizontally (i.e., to "any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home ....") but not vertically (i.e., to a
second purchaser in the chain of distribution) and the Indiana courts had not exercised their discre-
tion to extend warranties in these cases.
143. 837 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1988).
144. Id. at 301.
145. Collins Co., Ltd. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 508-09, 532 N.E.2d 834, 837 (1988).
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that the result was supported by its previous decisions, the actual lan-
guage of section 2-210(2)146 and the decisions of other courts which had
considered the question. With that answer in hand, the Seventh Circuit
held that the district court had erred and thus remanded the case for a
new trial.'
47
Carboline, through the certification process, illustrates the Court's
caution in this area. Unless state law has clearly dispensed with the priv-
ity requirement in commercial cases, the Court will preserve the defense.
The defense, however, may not be very important in most commercial
disputes. When complex goods are needed to meet particular needs, the
seller and a remote buyer will, in all probability, establish a sufficient
nexus either before or after the breach is claimed to satisfy the privity
requirement. 1
48
B. The Borderland Between the UCC and Tort
The tension between contract and tort principles is evident in dis-
putes over economic loss resulting from a breach of warranty. The dis-
pute may arise between the immediate parties to the sale or between the
manufacturer and a remote purchaser of the finished product. At stake
is whether contract or tort law applies. If contract law applies, the con-
tract incidents associated with warranty law, i.e., the notice and privity
requirements, disclaimers and agreed remedies and the contract statute
of limitations, apply to the suit. If tort law applies, the UCC limitations
may be inapplicable. 149 For example, in tort, privity is not required, con-
sequential damages are more difficult, although not necessarily impossi-
ble, to exclude' 50  and a potentially longer statute of limitations
146. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (1987) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or
buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other
party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially
his chance of obtaining return performance. A right to damages for breach of the whole contract or
a right arising out of the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation can be assigned despite
agreement otherwise."
147. 864 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1989).
148. Apart from a direct contractual relationship, the buyer may have relied upon seller adver-
tising or negotiated with the seller before the contract was signed. Or, the seller may have known for
whom the product was intended and for what purposes or actually attempted to cure the deficiency.
Contacts such as these have been held to establish privity. See, e.g., Crest Container Corp. v. R.H.
Bishop Co., 111 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1076, 445 N.E.2d 19, 25 (1982).
149. See Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Prod-
ucts Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37, 51-78 (1986).
150. More difficult, perhaps, but not impossible in the Seventh Circuit. See Wisconsin Power &
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 830 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1987) (clause clearly excludes conse-
quential damages for both contract and tort). Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th
Cir. 1975) (clause effective to exclude consequential damages even though "negligence" was not
mentioned). But see Berwind Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1976) (exclusion of
consequential damages not intended to cover damages for negligence).
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applies. 51 Obviously, disappointed buyers have an incentive to pursue a
tort theory when available.
This escape route, however, may be blocked. Many state and federal
courts have concluded that tort law does not apply when the loss caused
by the defective product is solely economic. 152 In its narrow sense, eco-
nomic loss includes the loss of bargain measured by the difference be-
tween the value of the goods as warranted and the value of the goods
received along with the net profits lost because the buyer was unable to
use the goods during the period of repair or replacement. In a broader
sense, economic loss may include damage to the goods sold beyond the
difference in value measurement. This approach ignores the nature of
the risk created by the defect and the manner of the accident, hallmarks
of tort law, 153 and emphasizes the importance of using contract theory as
a basis for allocating the various risks involved in the sale of commercial
products.
Against this backdrop, the Seventh Circuit has drawn the contract-
tort line at the point where the state, whose law controls, would probably
draw it. Thus, in cases where economic loss in the strict sense was in-
volved, the Court has held that Indiana,1 54 Wisconsin,
1 55 and Illinois1 56
would reject tort theory. The issue has not been squarely presented for
Indiana, Illinois or Wisconsin. However, in Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud
Tractors, the Court has also held that in the absence of a clear Wisconsin
precedent, it would not hold that tort law applied when the defect caused
additional damages to the product sold but not to other personal prop-
151. Under § 2-725, the statute of limitations for breach of warranty expires four years after the
seller's tender of delivery, whether the buyer knows of the breach or not. U.C.C. §§ 2-725(l)-(2)
(1987). In tort, the statute frequently runs two years after the buyer knew or should have known of
the injury. Thus, if the buyer first learns of the non-conformity six years after tender of delivery, the
warranty claims will be barred but the tort claim will still be available. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
152. Eg., East River S.S. Corp. v. TransAmerica DeLaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (maritime);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982). See Fallon, Physical
Injury and Economic Loss--The Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer, 27 VILL. L. REV. 483 (1982).
153. In some jurisdictions, if the defect created a risk of harm to persons or property and the
accident was "sudden and calamitous," tort law may apply even though the actual loss was solely
economic. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d
Cir. 1981).
154. Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1985) (Indiana does not
permit tort action in action governed by U.C.C. where only economic loss involved).
155. Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 830 F.2d 1405,1410 (7th Cir.
1987) (affirms earlier view that Wisconsin would not permit tort to recover economic loss, but avoids
question whether damage to goods sold would constitute a tort).
156. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Chicago E. Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1988) (buyer
cannot recover consequential economic losses on a negligence theory under Illinois law). The lead-
ing Illinois case is Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 ll.2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
For a review of post-Moorman decisions in Illinois, see Kishwaukee Community Health Serv.
Center v. Hospital Bldg. & Equip. Co., 638 F. Supp. 1492, 1498-99 (N.D. II. 1986).
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erty of the buyer. 157
The net effect of this deference to state law is, once again, an advan-
tage to the seller when an unmerchantable product causes only economic
loss. Resort to tort by the buyer is foreclosed and the claim must be
processed under Article 2, where the limitations of contract theory must
be surmounted. More particularly, the privity defense is alive and well in
Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, warranties may be disclaimed, conse-
quential damages caused by breach of warranty may easily be excluded
by agreement, and the pitfalls in and around the notice requirements and
the statute of limitations must be negotiated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Warranty disputes involving complex goods raise important issues
that test the balance struck by Article 2 between seller and buyer and the
capacity of the Seventh Circuit as a commercial court.
The importance of the Article 2 balance and sound methodology is
accentuated because the Court, following Erie, has left the availability of
the privity defense and the applicability of tort where disputes involve
economic loss to state law. Because of the decisions in Indiana, Illinois
and Wisconsin, privity is required and neither party can escape from Ar-
ticle 2 to the law of torts. In the process, the Court has endorsed local
law without attempting to develop a warranty theory within the frame-
work of the official text which might, independently, justify or question
those results. In short, it has assumed a passive rather than a leadership
role in this area.
Within this restricted context, the pattern of the Court's decisions
interpreting Article 2 gives an advantage to the seller. Concededly, some
of this advantage is built into Article 2, especially where complex goods
and particular purposes are involved. In addition to the buyer's burdens
of proof and the usual limitations upon contract remedies, Article 2 per-
mits agreed disclaimers and limited remedies and the UCC, in general,
supports agreed risk allocation. Thus, there is a good chance that the
risk of product disappointment will be on the buyer, even where the
157. 772 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1985), concluding that Wisconsin would not permit tort
recovery for economic loss where two manufacturers had agreed to warranty provisions in a case
governed by Article 2. Since the Court was unable to determine whether Wisconsin would classify
the goods sold as property damaged by breach as a warranty or tort, it refused to expand Wisconsin
law "in the absence of a more direct indication of intent by the state courts or legislature." Id. at
1333. More recently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has refused to apply tort law to a dispute be-
tween commercial parties in privity of contract "where the warranty given by the manufacturer
specifically precludes the recovery of such damages." Sunny Slope Grading v. Miller, Bradford &
Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 921, 437 N.W.2d 213, 218 (1989).
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Court employs sound Code methodology. In these cases, the problem, if
any, is with the Article 2 balance rather than with the Court.
Unfortunately, the Court's methodology has frequently been incom-
plete or unsound, 58 with the result being that the seller's advantage has
been enhanced. Among other things, the Court has:
(1) Substituted its judgment for that of the trier of fact without
fully developing the concept of merchantability;
(2) Complicated and misapplied the "basis of the bargain test" in
section 2-313(1);
(3) Misapplied and misunderstood the parol evidence rule;
(4) Interjected potential rigidity in the scope and proof of conse-
quential damages;
(5) Rejected the "equal opportunity" variation in mitigation of
damage principles;
(6) Interpreted sections 2-207 and 2-316 to permit the inclusion
and enforceability of disclaimers and limited remedies where the buyer
knew of the terms, even though statutory conditions were clearly not
satisfied;
(7) Admitted "custom" that negated consequential damages
without exploring or charging the trial court about critical limitations on
the scope of section 1-205;
(8) Where Erie applied, endorsed state interpretations of section
2-719(2) without an independent inquiry into the remedial consequences
where a limited remedy fails its essential purpose; 59
(9) Facilitated the exclusion of consequential damages where the
product claim was in tort; and
(10) Failed, despite repeated opportunities, to develop a coherent
approach to warranty disputes, drawn from a thorough and integrated
understanding and analysis of Article 2.
The cumulative effect of this litany does not commend the Seventh
158. In summary, the following methodological flaws can be found in the warranty cases just
considered: (1) Analysis is limited to just a few sections, omitting others of relevance, and, fre-
quently, Article 2 is treated as if it were an ancillary rather than the primary source of law; (2)
Statutory language and key definitions have been ignored; (3) There are no references to the history
of the concept at stake or the legislative history of the sections being interpreted; (4) The comments
are sometimes ignored or mischaracterized; (5) Cases from other jurisdictions interpreting the same
sections are rarely developed and contrary precedents are frequently ignored; (6) References to im-
portant secondary sources, such as J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, supra note 2, are sparse and rarely
used to best advantage.
159. An exception, of course, is AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933
(7th Cir. 1978), where Judge Moore was permitted to interpret the Official Text of the U.C.C. rather




Circuit. Clearly, no intentional preference for the seller can be detected
in the opinions. The cases analyzed arose over a twenty year span from a
variety of transactions and were argued before constantly changing
panels of judges. The quality of attorney advocacy (and of the judicial
clerking) may also have been a factor. But at most points, where a plau-
sible, if not required, interpretation favorable to the buyer could have
been adopted, the Court went the other way. This is surprising, because
in other cases involving Article 2, the Seventh Circuit has employed bet-
ter Code methodology with no pattern of outcomes favoring the seller. 160
Advantage seller? The answer is clearly yes. Is this a legitimate
advantage? Given the Court's questionable methodology and the litany
recited above, my answer is no. The penalty? At the very least, the
Court and its law clerks should be sentenced to take a refresher course in
the law of warranty liability and remedy contained in and around Article
2, Sales. Until more sophistication is acquired, it is hard to conclude that
the Seventh Circuit-in the warranty area at least-has emerged as a
major commercial law court.
160. Recent non-warranty cases where the Seventh Circuit has, in my judgment, employed bet-
ter Article 2 methodology include: Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.); Schulze & Butch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Eschbach, J.); R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy,
J.); Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.,
with a dissent by Easterbrook, J.); Jason's Foods, Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214
(7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.); Thomson Printing Mach. Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 714 F.2d 744 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Cudahy, J.).
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